Expanding the Crime of Genocide to Include Ethnic
Cleansing: A Return to Established Principles in Light of
Contemporary Interpretations
Micol Sirkin†
“‘The only alternative to ethnic minorities is ethnically pure states
created by slaughter or expulsion.’”1

I. INTRODUCTION
It may be surprising to discover that ethnic cleansing is legally distinct from genocide considering that the media use these terms interchangeably.2 Currently, no formal legal definition of ethnic cleansing
exists.3 In characterizing the acts of the Yugoslav war, however, the
United Nations Security Council’s Commission of Experts on violations
of humanitarian law stated that “‘ethnic cleansing’ means rendering an
area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove
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1. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Mass Expulsion in Modern International Law and Practice, in 41
INT’L STUD. IN HUM. RTS. 1, 108 (1995) (quoting Fearful Name from a Nazi Past, L.A. TIMES, June
22, 1994, at B6) (emphasis added).
2. See, e.g., Andy Segal, ‘Bombs for Peace’ After Slaughter in Bosnia, CNN, Dec. 4, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/11/20/sbm.bosnia.holbrooke/ (“Three years later, [Richard Holbrooke] would become one of the most influential U.S. figures working to end a war that
had introduced a new euphemism for genocide: ethnic cleansing.”); Steven R. Weisman, Powell
Declares Genocide in Sudan in Bid to Raise Pressure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2004, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/09/international/africa/09CND-SUDA.html?scp=1&sq=Powell%
20Declares%20Genocide%20in%20Sudan%20in%20Bid%20to%20Raise%20Pressure,&st=cse
(quoting former Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, who, in describing the atrocities occurring in
western Sudan, said “‘Call it civil war. Call it ethnic cleansing. Call it genocide. Call it ‘none of
the above.’ The reality is the same.’”).
3. Darfur Destroyed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan,
HUM. RTS. WATCH REP. (Human Rights Watch, New York, N.Y.), May 6, 2004, at 1, 39 [hereinafter
Darfur Destroyed].
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persons of given groups from the area.”4 Consequently, various U.N.
resolutions and reports, international criminal courts and tribunals, international organizations, and legal scholars have defined ethnic cleansing
as the forcible removal, displacement, deportation, and expulsion of an
ethnic group from a given territory.5 The forcible displacement of a particular group does not fall within the crime of genocide.6 The Genocide
Convention defines genocide as
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such: (a)
killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental
harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to
prevent births within the group; and (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.7

4. Letter Dated 9 February 1993 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the
Security Council, ¶ 55, Annex No. 1, U.N. Doc. S/25274 (Feb. 9, 1993) [hereinafter SecretaryGeneral Letter].
5. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 91st plen. mtg., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/121 (Dec. 18,
1992) (declaring that a consistent pattern of gross human rights violations, mass expulsions of defenseless civilians from their homes, and the existence of concentration camps and detention centers
were carried out in pursuit of an “abhorrent policy of ‘ethnic cleansing,’ which is a form of genocide”); Comm’n on Human Rights, Report of the Commission on Human Rights on its First Special
Session, at 2, delivered to the Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/S-1/8 (Aug.
14, 1992) (claiming that, at a minimum, ethnic cleansing entails “deportations and forcible mass
removal or expulsion of persons from their homes” and is “aimed at the dislocation or destruction of
national, ethnic, racial or religious groups”); Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3,
Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, ¶ 143 (Mar. 4, 2009); Prosecutor
v. Simić, Tadić, & Zarić, Case No. IT-95-9-T, Judgment, ¶ 133 (Oct. 17, 2003); Drazen Pretrovic,
Ethnic Cleansing—An Attempt at Methodology, 5 EUR. J. INT’L L. 342, 351–52 (1994) (“Ethnic
cleansing is a well-defined policy of a particular group of persons to systematically eliminate another
group from a given territory on the basis of religious, ethnic or national origin.”); Human Rights
Watch World Report 1994: Events of 1993, HUM. RTS. WATCH REP. (Human Rights Watch, New
York, N.Y.), 1994, at 201, (defining the practice of ethnic cleansing as “[t]he forcible deportation and
displacement, execution, confinement in detention camps or ghettos, and the use of siege of warfare,
to force the flight of the ‘enemy’ ethnic population”).
6. The crime of genocide was first codified under the Genocide Convention. Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. II, opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948,
102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. To date, 140 states have ratified the Genocide Convention, and the International Criminal Court (ICC), the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) have adopted its provisions. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 6, opened
for signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; Statute of the International
Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 2, ¶ 2, 33 I.L.M. 1598 [hereinafter ICTR Statute]; Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 4, § 2, May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1203 [hereinafter
ICTY Statute].
7. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. II.
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While ethnic cleansing could be construed as one of the foregoing
genocidal acts,8 it is typically understood to be a separate offense—a
crime against humanity.9
The crime of genocide also excludes a policy of ethnic cleansing.
Genocide is a specific intent crime; thus, to be held liable, the accused
must possess the general intent to commit the act as well as the specific
intent “to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such.”10 Because the crime of genocide requires the specific intent to destroy, international tribunals and legal scholars consider
displacing an ethnic group to achieve an ethnically homogenous territory
incompatible with genocidal intent.11 By interpreting an intention to destroy as distinct from an intention to displace, international tribunals
have lost sight of the principal evil that the crime of genocide is meant to
prevent and punish—denying a particular group of people the right to
exist.12
Although the legal similarities between genocide and ethnic cleansing have received some discussion from the International Criminal
Court (ICC),13 international tribunals,14 and various commentators,15 an
8. For example, deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about a group’s
physical destruction, imposing measures to prevent births within the group, or forcibly transferring
children could be construed as genocidal acts. See, e.g., Pretrovic, supra note 5, at 356–57 (stating
that certain methods of ethnic cleansing, such as torture, rape, and destruction of cultural and religious monuments, may fall within the genocidal acts of causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of a group and of deliberately inflicting on the group the conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction).
9. International courts and tribunals typically criminalize ethnic cleansing under the crime of
persecution or the crime of deportation or forcible transfer, which are both crimes against humanity.
See Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, ¶ 143; Simić, Case No. IT-95-9-T, ¶ 133.
10. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 6; ICTR Statute, supra note 6, art. 2, ¶ 2; ICTY Statute,
supra note 6, art. 4, ¶ 2; Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. II.
11. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brđjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 977–78 (Sept. 1,
2004) (holding that a plan intended solely to displace a population is insufficient to establish genocidal intent); WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES
234 (Cambridge Univ. Press) (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW] (“The issue is one of intent and it is logically inconceivable that the two agendas [of ethnic
cleansing and genocide] coexist.”).
12. G.A. Res. 96(I), at 188–89, (Dec. 11, 1946) (“Genocide is a denial of the right of existence
of entire human groups.”).
13. See, e.g., Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, ¶ 145 (holding that the practice of ethnic
cleansing may result in genocide if it brings about the commission of the objective elements of genocide with the specific intent to destroy).
14. See, e.g., Brđjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, ¶ 981 (holding “there are obvious similarities
between genocidal policy and the policy known as ethnic cleansing. The underlying criminal acts
for each may often be the same.”); Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 31 (Apr.
19, 2004).
15. See, e.g., Damir Mirković, Ethnic Conflict and Genocide: Reflections on Ethnic Cleansing
in the Former Yugoslavia, 548 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 191, 197 (1996) (“[I]n its
broader meaning, [ethnic cleansing] implies differential treatment and discrimination with a view to
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elaborate discussion of (1) the legal consequences of preserving a distinction versus incorporating the two acts; (2) the persuasiveness of
states’ reasons for refusing to include ethnic cleansing within the Genocide Convention; or (3) how to incorporate ethnic cleansing into the Genocide Convention is still lacking.
This Comment specifies how ethnic cleansing fits into genocide’s
distinctly destructive purpose and effect. I argue that because ethnic
cleansing and genocide result in similar harms and derive from similar
agendas, international courts ought to find perpetrators guilty of the
crime of genocide when genocidal acts are committed with the intent to
create an ethnically homogenous territory. A policy of ethnic cleansing
is a genocidal policy.
Part II of this Comment reviews the legislative history of the Genocide Convention to provide a justification for preserving the heightened
legal and political status currently attributed to the crime of genocide.
Part III summarizes recent international courts’ interpretations of destruction as it applies to genocidal acts and genocidal intent, particularly
their refusal to incorporate cultural destruction within their understanding
of genocidal intent. By excluding cultural destruction from the crime of
genocide, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the
ICC have demonstrated that they are averse to equating a policy of ethnic
cleansing with the intent to destroy. Part IV argues that the aim of genocide—the intent to destroy a human group—actually parallels a policy of
ethnic cleansing. Intending to expel a certain ethnic group to achieve an
ethnically homogenous territory is an intention to destroy that ethnic
group. Part V explains how already developed limits on genocidal intent
may be used to interpret a policy of ethnic cleansing as the intent to destroy.

putting on pressure to comply, to emigrate, to give up and to assimilate, and in its narrower or restrictive meaning, it denotes destruction, which through acts of terrorism, forceful relocation, and
expulsion, leads ultimately to genocide.”); Pretrovic, supra note 5, at 356 (claiming that some methods of ethnic cleansing fall within the parameters of genocidal acts); John Webb, Genocide Treaty—Ethnic Cleansing—Substantive and Procedural Hurdles in the Application of the Genocide
Convention to Alleged Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, 23 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 377, 402
(1993) (acts of ethnic cleansing are intended to destroy the victimized group in whole or in part and
therefore are acts of genocide within the meaning of Article II of the Genocide Convention); Linnea
D. Manashaw, Comment, Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing: Why the Distinction? A Discussion in
the Context of Atrocities Occurring in Sudan, 35 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 303, 329 (2005) (in recognition
of the similarities and differences between genocide and ethnic cleansing, a Convention on Ethnic
Cleansing could narrowly define ethnic cleansing as either a crime against humanity or a separate
strict international crime).
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II. GENOCIDE AS THE CRIME OF CRIMES
Currently, genocide is an offense separate from crimes against humanity,16 whereas ethnic cleansing is generally classified as a crime
against humanity.17 Crimes against humanity include a long list of inhumane acts, such as murder; extermination; enslavement; torture; persecution on political, racial, and religious grounds; and deportation or forcible transfer of a population.18 However, the commission of one of the
foregoing acts is not enough. To be held liable for a crime against humanity, the act must be “committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack directed against any civilian population.”19
In comparing crimes against humanity with the crime of genocide,
the similarities between the crimes’ acts are apparent.20 However, there
are three notable distinctions between the two crimes: (1) genocide pertains only to crimes whose victims belong to protected groups (race, ethnicity, nationality, or religion), while crimes against humanity may be
committed against any civilian population; (2) genocide requires a specific intent to destroy a group because its members share a common national, racial, ethnic, or religious identity, while crimes against humanity
do not require any specific intent; and (3) a single isolated act could
qualify as genocide, while a single isolated act against a civilian is unlikely to qualify as a crime against humanity because the latter must be
committed within the context of a widespread or systematic attack.21
The first distinction is insufficient to differentiate the two crimes
because an ethnic group is one of the protected groups within the crime
of genocide. The third distinction is both uncommon and insignificant:
although in theory a genocidal act could be completed in isolation from a
widespread or systematic attack, history suggests that genocide is commonly committed as part of a state policy or shared plan.22 Furthermore,
16. See Rome Statute, supra note 6, arts. 6–7; ICTR Statute, supra note 6, arts. 2–3; ICTY
Statute, supra note 6, arts. 4–5.
17. See supra note 9.
18. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 7; see also ICTR Statute, supra note 6, art. 3 (excluding
enforced disappearance of people and the crime of apartheid); ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 5
(excluding enforced disappearance of people and the crime of apartheid).
19. Id.
20. It takes no stretch of the imagination to see how genocidal acts—killing, causing serious
bodily or mental harm, inflicting conditions of life calculated to bring about a group’s physical destruction, imposing measures intended to prevent birth, and forcibly transferring children—fit into at
least one of the acts enumerated under crimes against humanity, if not inhumane acts in general.
E.g., RONALD C. SLYE & BETH VAN SCHAACK, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE ESSENTIALS
235 (2009).
21. See id. at 210–11.
22. See, e.g., Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 1, 73 (Judgment of Feb. 26) (holding “when part
of the group is targeted, that part must be significant enough for its destruction to have an impact on

494

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 33:2

because widespread or systematic attacks result in considerable suffering
and are likely to recur, the international community is most concerned
with mass atrocities rather than isolated acts. Therefore, the essential
distinction between genocide and ethnic cleansing is intent.
Given that the distinction between crimes against humanity and genocide is narrow, several legal scholars downplay differences and even
suggest converging the two crimes.23 To appreciate the significance of
the distinctions and similarities, this section will provide an overview of
the events and legislative history prompting the formation of the international crime of genocide, the legal status attributed to genocide, and the
unique features of genocidal intent. Ultimately, the policy underlying
genocidal intent justifies preserving genocide as a separate offense.
A. The Formation of the Crime of Genocide
Although the systematic killing of national, racial, ethnic, and religious groups has occurred throughout world history, it was not until 1944
that Raphael Lemkin coined the term “genocide.”24 Lemkin recognized
the absence of any crime aimed to prevent and punish the murder and
destruction of millions.25 Genocide is not just mass murder or the destruction of a nation; genocide is the eradication of a people.26 Consequently, Lemkin proposed criminalizing genocide to account for the discriminatory nature and the destructive impact of acts that are now collectively known as genocide.27
Lemkin’s definition provided that,
“‘Whoever, while participating in a conspiracy to destroy a national, racial or religious group, undertakes an attack against life, liberty or prop-

the group as a whole”); Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 51
GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 88, U.N. A/51/10 (1996), reprinted in [1996] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 17,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.527/Add.8 (finding that crimes like genocide and other crimes against humanity are “of such magnitude that they often require some type of involvement on the part of high level
government officials or military commanders”); William A. Schabas, Genocide, Crimes Against
Humanity, and Darfur: The Commission of Inquiry’s Findings on Genocide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV.
1703, 1711 (2006) [hereinafter Schabas, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, and Darfur].
23. See SLYE & VAN SCHAACK, supra note 20, at 239; Schabas, Genocide, Crimes Against
Humanity, and Darfur, supra note 22, at 1719–21 (claiming that since the adoption of the Rome
Statute, the legal distinctions between genocide and crimes against humanity has been largely eliminated).
24. RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 79 (1944). Lemkin was born in eastern Poland and later became an influential lawyer, prosecutor, and university teacher. SCHABAS,
GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 28. By the 1930s, he was internationally
known as a scholar in the field of international criminal law. Id. at 28–29.
25. Raphael Lemkin, in Genocide, 15 AMERICAN SCHOLAR, 227, 227 (1946) [hereinafter Lemkin, Genocide].
26. Id.
27. Id.
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erty of members of such groups is guilty of the crime of genocide.’”28
The underlying premise of Lemkin’s definition is that the harm is qualitatively different from the individual lives lost; the harm is the loss of an
entire people.29
The first opportunity to apply Lemkin’s definition of genocide
arose during the Nuremberg Trial of the Major War Criminals in 1945.
Although the war criminals were charged with genocide, they were convicted of war crimes and crimes against humanity.30 The reason for this
result was that genocide was outside the International Military Tribunal’s
(IMT) jurisdiction.31 The Charter of the IMT provided no definition, or
even mention, of genocide.32 Moreover, the Charter required that for a
crime to constitute a crime against humanity, it must be committed “before or during the war”—in connection with the international armed conflict.33
Partly in response to the IMT’s inability to convict defendants of
genocide or crimes against humanity committed during peacetime,34 and
partly in response to the emerging acceptance of the term genocide,35 the
United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 96(I) unanimously
and without debate.36 General Assembly Resolution 96(I) established
genocide as a crime under international law and invited U.N. member
states to enact legislation aimed at preventing and punishing genocide,37
which, in turn, prompted the drafting of the Genocide Convention.38
The U.N. Secretariat’s Human Rights Division was first assigned
the task of drafting a genocide convention.39 The Division relied on
Lemkin and two other experts—a former judge of the IMT and a Romanian law professor—as well as the U.N. Secretary-General for guidance.40 Among the various issues that arose during the drafting process
were whether and how to distinguish genocide from crimes against hu28. Id. at 230.
29. Id.
30. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 43, 47–48.
31. Id. at 42.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 52. The fear was that atrocities not committed in connection with an armed conflict
would go unpunished due to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege—no crime can be committed
and no punishment imposed without an established law. Id.
35. National military tribunals began referencing and describing genocide in their indictments,
judgments, and oral arguments. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at
48–52.
36. Id. at 55.
37. G.A. Res. 96 (I), at 188–89 (Dec. 11, 1946).
38. Genocide Convention, G.A. Res. 260 (III), pmbl., (Dec. 9, 1948).
39. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 60.
40. Id.

496

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 33:2

manity.41 In the end, the drafters decided to move forward with a genocide convention, making genocide an international crime punishable
“whether committed in time of peace or in time of war.”42 This provision, combined with the Genocide Convention’s exclusion of any reference to the Nuremberg judgment,43 suggests that a majority of states
treated genocide as a crime separate from crimes against humanity.
Although crimes against humanity were punishable only in the context of war at the time the Genocide Convention was finalized in 1948,
today, crimes against humanity are punishable during both times of war
and times of peace.44 Despite this similarity, there remain key distinctions that justify preserving genocide as a separate offense.
B. The Legal Import of the Crime of Genocide
Both the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity prohibit
the most inhumane, cruel, and violent acts known to man. However,
classifying an atrocity as genocide has a much greater legal and political
effect than classifying it as a crime against humanity. The legal significance does not lie in the severity of the sentence45 but rather in the stability and certainty that the Genocide Convention provides. Crimes against
humanity are articulated only in statutes founding international criminal
courts or tribunals and not in any multilateral treaty or agreement like the
Genocide Convention. The Genocide Convention and its legislative history have generated special legal duties and remedies.46 Unlike crimes
against humanity, the crime of genocide clearly creates obligations on
state parties to the Convention and provides state parties with civil remedies not available to states victimized by crimes against humanity.

41. Id. at 60–61.
42. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. I.
43. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 87–88. States wished to
avoid confusion between genocide and crimes and against humanity and adopted the IMT’s restrictive war nexus requirement. Id.
44. Compare ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 5, with Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 7, and
ICTR Statute, supra note 6, art. 3. See also SLYE & VAN SCHAACK, supra note 20, at 213–14, 231.
45. The Genocide Convention, the Rome Statute, the ICTR Statute, and the ICTY Statute do
not provide any specific sentencing guidelines, leaving sentencing to the discretion of domestic or
international courts. See Rome Statute, supra note 6; ICTR Statute, supra note 6; ICTY Statute,
supra note 6. Therefore, classifying a crime as a crime against humanity or as genocide does not
accurately predict the punishment imposed.
46. SLYE & VAN SCHAACK, supra note 20, at 213 (“Unlike the crimes of genocide, torture, and
war crimes, crimes against humanity never became the subject of a comprehensive penal treaty in
the postwar period.”).
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1. The Duty to Prevent
Under the Genocide Convention, state parties have the duties to
prevent and to punish the crime of genocide47—and the obligation not to
commit genocide—through their organs, persons, or groups whose conduct is attributable to them.48 By imposing a duty to prevent, the Convention permits state parties to take action against perpetrators before
genocide becomes a reality. In contrast, a duty to punish compels states
to wait for the actual atrocities to occur before any action may be taken.
Testament of the crime of genocide’s duty to prevent requirement is the
additional responsibility imposed on those who directly or publicly incite
genocide.49 While inciting others to commit genocide generates criminal
responsibility, inciting others to commit crimes against humanity does
not.50
State parties have a duty not only to prevent genocide on their own
but also to encourage international preventative efforts. The Genocide
Convention explicitly permits any contracting party to “call upon the
competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the
Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide.”51 Although the U.N. Charter already demands that effective measures be taken to prevent and remove threats to international peace and security,52 an article specifying
the role of the U.N. in preventing and suppressing genocide is especially
significant because it promotes international efforts to stop the atrocities
from commencing or continuing.53 Thus, by specifically permitting not

47. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn.
& Herz. v. Yugo. (Serb. & Mont.)), 1996 I.C.J. 595, 616 (Preliminary Objections Judgment of July
11) (holding that each state has the obligation to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide).
48. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn.
& Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 1, 67 (Judgment of Feb. 26).
49. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 25, ¶ 3(e); ICTR Statute, supra note 6, art. 2, ¶ 3(c); ICTY
Statute, supra note 6, art. 4, ¶ 3(c); Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. III.
50. See Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 25, ¶ 3; ICTR Statute, supra note 6, art. 6, ¶ 1; ICTY
Statute, supra note 6, art. 7, ¶ 1.
51. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. VIII.
52. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1; see also id. art. 35, ¶ 1 (“Any Member of the United Nations may
bring any dispute, or any situation [which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute], to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.”).
53. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of
Minorities, Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, ¶ 68, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6 (July 2, 1985) (prepared by B. Whitaker)
(“The value of an article specifying the role of the United Nations in the prevention and suppression
of genocide is especially evident, because until some special agency is set up, there is no other international organization to see to the implementation of the Convention.”).
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only the Security Council but also the U.N. to prevent genocide, the Genocide Convention provides additional authority for intervention.54
2. International Court of Justice Jurisdiction
Providing the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with automatic jurisdiction over disputes involving state parties to the Genocide Convention evidences strong state interests in preventing genocide and attaining
appropriate redress. Article IX of the Genocide Convention grants, upon
the request of one the contracting parties, the ICJ jurisdiction to decide
disputes relating to the interpretation, application, or fulfillment of the
Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a state for
genocide.55 The ICJ has interpreted Article IX as conferring personal
jurisdiction over any state that is a party to the Convention56 and subject
matter jurisdiction over any state acts that fall under the Convention’s
provisions.57 In contrast, treaties and customary international law comprising crimes against humanity, even if closely related to the provisions
of the Genocide Convention, do not fall under the jurisdiction of the
ICJ.58 Thus, a state cannot seek relief—in the form of an injunction or
reparations—before the ICJ for the commission of a crime against humanity unless both states consent to ICJ jurisdiction.59
C. Genocidal Intent as the Crucial Distinction
What makes genocide distinct from crimes against humanity? International criminal courts and legal scholars assert that genocide’s specific intent requirement, or genocidal intent, establishes its reputation as

54. Some may argue that this merely reflects a failure of the U.N. structure and function and
that, therefore, crimes against humanity should invoke the same U.N. attention and involvement as
genocide. Nonetheless, genocide continues to receive this special status, which is not shared by
crimes against humanity.
55. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. IX.
56. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn.
& Herz. v. Yugo. (Serb. & Mont.)), 1996 I.C.J. 595, 610, (Preliminary Objections Judgment of July
11) (holding that Yugoslavia is bound by the provisions of the Genocide Convention because it was
party to the Convention at the time it filed the Application).
57. Id. at 614 (to determine whether the ICJ has jurisdiction, it must verify that the dispute
between the parties falls within the scope of that provision).
58. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn.
& Herz. v. Yugo. (Serb. & Mont.)), 1993 I.C.J. 325, 341, (Judgment of Sept. 13) (the customary and
conventional international laws of war and international humanitarian law—including but not limited to the four Geneva Conventions, the Hague Regulations on Land and Warfare of 1907, and the
Nuremberg Charter, Judgment, and Principles—do not establish prima facie jurisdiction because the
texts do not confer jurisdiction upon the ICJ).
59. U.N. Charter app. art. 34, ¶ 1 (Statute of the International Court of Justice).
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the “crime of crimes.”60 Unlike genocide, crimes against humanity are
not specific intent crimes; the perpetrator need intend only the prohibited
act. Although the ICTY and ICTR have required that the perpetrator also
have knowledge that his or her actions were part of a widespread or systematic attack, the mens rea element of crimes against humanity is still
easier to prove than genocidal intent.61
To be convicted of genocide, the perpetrator must not only intend to
commit the genocidal act but also intend “to destroy, in whole or in part,
a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, as such.”62 To find genocidal intent, it is not enough to target a person because of his nationality,
ethnicity, race, or religion.63 This discriminatory intent must be accompanied by the intent to destroy the group.64 That is, the perpetrator must
target individuals because of their membership in a protected group and
do so with the overall objective of destroying the group.65 Thus, the victim of genocide is the group, not the individual.66
Although both genocide and crimes against humanity cause extreme suffering and pain on a massive scale, genocide is especially evil
because a group’s very existence is at stake. Because of this additional
harm, genocidal intent is the distinguishing characteristic that justifies

60. Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 16 (Sept. 4,
1998) (“The crime of genocide is unique because of its element of dolus specialis (special intent) . . .
hence the Chamber is of the opinion that genocide constitutes the crime of crimes.”); Prosecutor v.
Serushago, Case No. ICTR-98-39-S, Sentence, ¶ 15 (Feb. 5, 1999). Although the ICTR later held
that there is no hierarchical gradation of crimes and that all crimes under the ICTR Statute constitute
serious violations of international humanitarian law, the Appeals Chamber made this remark only to
demonstrate that both genocide and crimes against humanity are capable of attracting the same sentence. Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Judgment (Reasons), ¶ 367
(June 1, 2001). The Appeals Chamber held that “the Trial Chamber’s description of the genocide as
the ‘crime of crimes’ was at the level of general appreciation.” Id. See also Prosecutor v. Brđjanin,
Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 699 (Sept. 1, 2004) (“The intent to destroy makes genocide an
exceptionally grave crime and distinguishes it from other serious crimes.”); Prosecutor v. Krstić,
Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 134 (Apr. 19, 2004) (“Genocide is one of the worst crimes
known to humankind, and its gravity is reflected in the stringent requirement of specific intent.”);
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities,
Revised and Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, ¶ 38, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6 (July 2, 1985) (prepared by B. Whitaker) (“It is the
element of intent to destroy a designated group wholly or partially which raises crimes of mass murder and against humanity to qualify as the special crime of genocide.”).
61. SLYE & VAN SCHAACK, supra note 20, at 218.
62. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 6; ICTR Statute, supra note 6, art. 2, ¶ 2; ICTY Statute,
supra note 6, art. 4, ¶ 2; Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. II.
63. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 22, at 88.
See also Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Judgment, ¶ 20 (Mar. 22, 2006).
64. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 22, at 88.
65. Id.
66. Id.; Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 552 (Aug. 2, 2001); Prosecutor
v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 731 (Sept. 2, 1998).
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the unqualified duties, international intervention, and universal condemnation resulting from the Genocide Convention. This is not to say that
crimes against humanity are insignificant or undeserving of punishment
or prevention. However, lumping the crimes together will weaken the
stigma attached to the crime of genocide and will make universal cooperation more difficult. Therefore, the crime of genocide should remain
the “crime of crimes” with little room for expansion.
III. THE MEANING OF “DESTROY”: THE EXCLUSION OF CULTURAL
DESTRUCTION FROM THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
The Genocide Convention’s legislative history and judicial interpretations of the crime of genocide define “destroy” as physical or biological destruction, deliberately leaving out cultural destruction. When
international courts discuss acts of ethnic cleansing, they typically refer
to the forcible removal of a population. Acts of forcibly removing a
population can be used as evidence of physical or biological destruction
in support of establishing genocide. However, because they classify
forcible removals as cultural destruction, international courts will not
interpret a policy of ethnic cleansing as a genocidal policy. The premise
behind the courts’ reasoning is that intent to displace is not intent to destroy. This Part begins with an introduction to what ethnic cleansing is
and how the U.N. and international courts and tribunals have defined
destruction. This Part ends with a discussion of how international courts
and tribunals interpret ethnic cleansing—first as an act and then as a policy—as distinct from destruction.
A. What is Ethnic Cleansing?
To understand judicial decisions interpreting ethnic cleansing, one
must understand what ethnic cleansing is. International courts and tribunals most frequently define ethnic cleansing as rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of
given groups from the area.67 Yet, it is still not a formal crime of its
own.68 Thus, international courts and tribunals commonly criminalize
ethnic cleansing under the crime of deportation or forcible transfer or the
crime of persecution—both crimes against humanity.69
67. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, ¶ 143 (Mar. 4, 2009); Secretary-General Letter, supra note
4, at ¶ 55.
68. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn.
& Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 1, 71 (Judgment of Feb. 26).
69. See, e.g., Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, ¶ 143; Prosecutor v. Simić, Tadić, &
Zarić, Case No. IT-95-9-T, Judgment, ¶ 133 (Oct. 17, 2003).
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International courts and tribunals have punished perpetrators of
ethnic cleansing by prosecuting them for the crime of deportation or
forcible transfer.70 Deportation and forcible transfer relate to the unlawful displacement, expulsion, relocation, or removal of persons from the
territory in which they reside.71 Thus, ethnic cleansing describes both
transfers outside a state as well as transfers within a state.72 What matters is not the destination but rather the forced character of the displacement.73 However, forcible transfer is not restricted to physical force; it
may include the threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of
violence, duress, detention, or psychological oppression.74 Because removal may be accomplished by threats or fear of violence, ethnic cleansing includes means such as murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, extra-judicial executions, rape and sexual assault, confinement of
civilian population in ghetto areas, deliberate military attacks or threats
of attacks, and wanton destruction of property.75 Therefore, ethnic cleansing may be achieved by physically transferring an ethnic group from a
territory and by threatening or coercing removal through violent acts. In
addition, the crime of deportation or forcible transfer requires that the
perpetrator unlawfully displace a person with the intent to permanently
displace that person.76 Although the displacement does not in fact need
to be permanent, the perpetrator must still intend that the victim not return.77
Ethnic cleansing is also criminalized as persecution.78 Persecution
is “the gross or blatant denial, on discriminatory grounds, of a fundamental right, laid down in international customary or treaty law, reaching the
same level of gravity” as the other acts that constitute crimes against hu70. See, e.g., Simić, Case No. IT-95-9-T, ¶ 133.
71. Simić, Case No. IT-95-9-T, ¶¶ 121–24.
72. Id. ¶ 122.
73. Id. ¶ 125.
74. Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, Report of the Preparatory Commission
for the International Criminal Court, 11 n.12, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 2000).
75. Secretary-General Letter, supra note 4, ¶ 56. See also The Secretary-General, Report of
the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, ¶ 9, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. S/24809, A/47/666 (Nov. 17, 1992) (prepared by Tadeusz Mazowiecki) [hereinafter
Third Mazowiecki Report of 1992].
76. See Prosecutor v. Karadžić & Mladić, Cases No. IT-95-5-R61, IT-95-18-R61, Review of
the Indictments Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ¶ 62 (July 11, 1996)
(citing expert witness Professor Garde, who testified that “‘ethnic cleansing is a practice which
means that you act in such a way that in a given territory the members of a given ethnic group are
eliminated, aiming that a given territory be ‘ethnically pure’, in other words, that that territory would
contain only members of the ethnic group that took the initiative of cleansing the territory’”).
77. Prosecutor v. Simić, Tadić, & Zarić, Case No. IT-95-9-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 133–34 (Oct. 17,
2003). The duration of the displacement has no impact on its legality. Id. ¶ 134.
78. Prosecutor v. Kupre{ki}, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 606–07 (Jan. 14, 2000).
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manity.79 No exhaustive or complete list of persecutory acts exists. Rather, persecution consists of a variety of inhumane acts,80 including killing, detention, deportation, expulsion, destruction of homes and property,
and passing and implementing discriminatory laws.81 Because persecution comprises other crimes against humanity, persecution’s distinct element is the discriminatory basis for the act:82 the intent to attack any
identifiable group on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, gender, or
other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under
international law.83 Although perpetrators of ethnic cleansing are prosecuted for crimes that entail the use of violent force and discriminatory
intent, destruction is an exclusively genocidal element.
B. The Meaning of Destroy
Both the drafters of the Genocide Convention and the international
criminal tribunals have interpreted the term destroy to exclude cultural
genocide, which, in turn, bars ethnic cleansing from the crime of genocide. Despite Lemkin and the initial drafters’ efforts to include cultural
genocide, states found reasons for keeping it out.
In drafting the Genocide Convention, the drafters considered three
different types of genocide: physical, biological, and cultural. Physical
genocide “involves acts intended to ‘cause the death of members of a
group, or injuring their health or physical integrity.’”84 For example,
physical genocide includes: massacres and executions; subjection to conditions of life that are likely to result in the debilitation or death of the
individuals (“slow death”);85 mutilation and biological experiments imposed with no curative purpose; deprivation of all means of livelihood by
confiscation of property, looting, curtailment of work; and denial of
housing and of supplies otherwise available to the other inhabitants of
the territory concerned.86 Biological genocide is characterized by measures aimed at the extinction of a group of human beings by systematic

79. Id. ¶ 621.
80. Id. ¶ 623.
81. Id. ¶¶ 610–12, 628–31.
82. Id. ¶ 636.
83. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 7, paras. 1(h), 2(g). See also ICTR Statute, supra note 6,
art. 3, para. (h) (prohibiting “persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds”); ICTY Statute,
supra note 6, art. 5, para. (h) (prohibiting “persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds”).
84. The Secretary-General, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, 25, delivered to the
Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc. E/447 (June 26, 1947) [hereinafter The Secretary-General,
Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide].
85. Examples include the lack of proper housing, clothing, food, hygiene and medical care, and
excessive work or physical exertion. Id.
86. Id. at 24–25.
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restrictions on births without which the group cannot survive.87 For example, biological genocide includes: sterilization, compulsory abortion;
segregation of the sexes; and obstacles to marriage.88 Cultural genocide
consists of “the destruction by brutal means of the specific characteristics
of a group.”89 For example, cultural genocide includes: forced transfer of
children to another group; forced and systematic exile of individuals
representing the culture of a group; prohibition of the use of the national
language in private intercourse; systematic destruction of books printed
in the national language, or of religious works, or prohibition of new
publications; systematic destruction of historical or religious monuments
or their diversion to alien uses; and destruction or dispersion of documents and objects of historical, artistic, or religious value.90
There was little debate as to the inclusion in the Genocide Convention of physical and biological genocide.91 However, the three experts
appointed to assist in the initial drafting of the Genocide Convention, one
of whom was Lemkin, debated the inclusion of cultural genocide.92 In
support of including cultural genocide, Lemkin argued that the destruction of the diversity of cultures is as disastrous as the physical destruction
of nations.93 For Lemkin, cultural genocide was more than just a policy
of forced assimilation by moderate coercion; it was “a policy which by
drastic methods, aimed at the rapid and complete disappearance of the
cultural, moral and religious life of a group of human beings.”94 The
other two experts, on the other hand, argued that cultural genocide constituted the protection of minorities, which overextends the scope of genocide.95 However, Lemkin’s arguments proved successful. The draft
convention that the U.N. Secretary-General submitted to the Economic
and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1947 included cultural genocide,96 as

87. Id. at 26.
88. Id.
89. The Secretary-General, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, supra note 84, at 26.
90. Id. at 27–28.
91. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 74–75.
92. Id. at 61.
93. The Secretary-General, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, supra note 84, at 27.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See id. at 26–28 for the Secretary-General’s draft convention’s cultural genocide provisions. Note, however, that the Secretary-General’s draft convention does not include forced assimilation or mass displacement as a genocidal act. Id. at 24. The drafters excluded forced assimilation
because it was considered part of a policy aimed at protecting minorities, which was beyond the
scope of genocide. Id. The drafters also excluded mass displacement unless it led to slow death of
the whole or part of the group. Id.
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did the Ad Hoc Committee97 draft convention submitted to the Commission on Human Rights in 1948.98 It was not until the General Assembly
weighed in that cultural genocide was excluded from the Convention.
The Sixth Committee of the General Assembly debated the inclusion of cultural genocide but ultimately decided—by 25 votes to 16, with
4 abstentions and 13 delegations absent—to exclude provisions relating
to cultural genocide from its final draft.99 State representatives presented
various arguments for excluding cultural genocide: human rights law is
better suited to protect against cultural genocide than international criminal law; there are legitimate and justifiable reasons for a state to assimilate or amalgamate minorities and indigenous inhabitants; acts of cultural
genocide, such as closing down a library or destroying a school, are not
proportionally serious or violent; and the definition of cultural genocide
proffered was too vague and broad.100
Since then, the International Law Commission (ILC) has affirmed
that genocide is “the destruction of a group either by physical or biological means, not the destruction of the national, linguistic, cultural or other
identity of a particular group,”101 and international courts and tribunals
have interpreted destruction as purely physical and biological, excluding
cultural destruction.102
97. The ECOSOC put together the Ad Hoc Committee, which was comprised of seven state
representatives from China, France, Lebanon, Poland, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Venezuela. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 69–70.
98. Id. at 75. The Ad Hoc Committee’s draft cultural genocide provision, which was adopted
five votes to two, stated:
[G]enocide also means any deliberate act committed with the intent to destroy the language, religion or culture of a national, racial or religious group on grounds of national or
racial origin or religious belief such as:
(1) prohibiting the use of the language of the group in daily intercourse or in
schools, or the printing and circulation of publications in the language of the
group;
(2) destroying, or preventing the use of, libraries, museums, schools, historical
monuments, places of worship or other cultural institutions and objects of the
group.
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee on Genocide, 17, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc E/794 (May 24, 1948).
99. U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 83d mtg. at 206, U.N. Doc A/C.6/SR.83 (Oct. 25, 1948).
100. Id.
101. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 22, at
90–91.
102. See, e.g., Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 1, 124 (Judgment of Feb. 26); Prosecutor v.
Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 25 (Apr. 19, 2004) (relying on the ILC report in holding
that the Genocide Convention and customary international law prohibit only the physical or biological destruction of a human group); Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment, ¶
315 (May 15, 2003) (the meaning of “destroy” encompasses only acts that amount to physical or
biological genocide).
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C. Ethnic Cleansing as a Genocidal Act?
The ICTY uses the term destruction to establish both the actus reus
and the mens rea elements of the crime of genocide. In other words, the
perpetrator must not only intend to destroy a particular group, but he or
she must also contribute to the destruction of that particular group
through his or her actions.103 This section discusses the interpretation of
destruction as a genocidal act, while the following section will discuss
the interpretation of destruction as genocidal intent. In determining genocide’s actus reus, the ICTY has held that the forcible removal of an
ethnic group is not itself a genocidal act but may be a condition calculated to bring about its physical destruction.
On one hand, the ICTY precludes the forcible removal of an ethnic
group from the actus reus element of the crime of genocide, limiting its
use to proof of genocidal intent.104 The ICTY has made a conscious effort to exclude the forcible transfer, displacement, expulsion, and deportation of an ethnic group from constituting genocidal acts.105 Instead,
forcible removal is prosecuted as either persecution or the forcible transfer of a population.106
On the other hand, when the forcible removal of an ethnic group
constructively causes physical destruction, it may constitute a genocidal
act, specifically, a condition of life calculated to bring about a group’s
physical destruction.107 A condition calculated to bring about such physical destruction is construed as “the methods of destruction by which the
perpetrator does not immediately kill the members of the group, but
which, ultimately, seek their physical destruction.”108 Examples of such
conditions include systematic expulsion from homes109 or the creation of
103. See, e.g., Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, ¶ 9.
104. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Krajiŝnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Judgment, ¶ 854 (Sept. 27, 2006)
(evidence of deliberate forcible transfer may be relied on as evidence of the mens rea of genocide);
Prosecutor v. Brđjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 975 (Sept. 1, 2004) (“whilst forcible
displacement does not constitute in and of itself a genocidal act, it does not preclude a Trial Chamber
from relying on it as evidence of intent”); Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶
33 (Apr. 19, 2004) (“The fact that the forcible transfer does not constitute in and of itself a genocidal
act does not preclude a Trial Chamber from relying on it as evidence of the intentions of [the accused persons].”).
105. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 519 (July 31, 2003) (“It
does not suffice to deport a group or a part of a group. A clear distinction must be drawn between
physical destruction and mere dissolution of a group. The expulsion of a group or part of a group
does not in itself suffice for genocide.”).
106. See supra note 9.
107. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. II, ¶ (c).
108. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 505 (Sept. 2, 1998). See
Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, ¶ 517.
109. Brđjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, ¶ 691; Stakić, Case No. IT 97-24-T, ¶ 517; Prosecutor v.
Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 52 (Dec. 6, 1999).
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circumstances that would lead to a slow death, such as the lack of proper
housing, clothing, hygiene, and excessive work or physical exertion.110
Physical destruction is inevitable when people are driven from their
homes and forced to travel long distances in a country where they are
exposed to starvation, thirst, heat, cold, and epidemics.111 Both the ICJ
and the ILC have supported this interpretation.112 Therefore, ethnic
cleansing qualifies as a genocidal act when the process of forcibly removing a population causes physical destruction.
Thus, international courts and tribunals permit evidence of ethnic
cleansing in finding a condition calculated to bring about a group’s physical destruction but preclude ethnic cleansing from constituting a genocidal act in and of itself. But even when forcible removals ultimately
lead to the physical destruction of an ethnic group, ethnic cleansing is not
genocide without a showing of genocidal intent.
D. A Policy of Ethnic Cleansing Does Not Constitute Genocidal Intent
Just as acts of ethnic cleansing may be used as support for, but do
not constitute genocidal acts, a policy of ethnic cleansing may be used as
evidence of, but does not itself constitute, genocidal intent. That is, the
act of forcibly displacing a population may amount to genocide if it is in
furtherance of a genocidal policy. But a policy of ethnic cleansing does
not establish genocidal intent, even if the implementation of such a policy entails genocidal acts that cause physical or biological destruction.
According to the ICTY and the ICJ, the basis for classifying ethnic
cleansing separately from genocide is simple: a policy of ethnic cleansing is not the same as the intent to destroy. The cases below illustrate
how the courts make such a distinction.
First, the act of forcibly displacing a population may be used to infer genocidal intent, but does not itself establish genocidal intent.113 For

110. Brđjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, ¶ 691; Prosecutor v. Kayishema & Ruzindana, Case No.
ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 115–16 (May 21, 1999); Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, ¶ 517; Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, ¶ 52.
111. The Secretary-General, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, supra note 84, at 24.
112. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 22, at
90–92 (claiming that deportation is a condition of life calculated to bring about a group’s physical
destruction if carried out with genocidal intent); Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 1, 71 (Judgment
of Feb. 26) (holding acts of ethnic cleansing that may be characterized as a condition of life calculated to bring about a group’s physical destruction constitute genocide if carried out with genocidal
intent).
113. See Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont., 2007 I.C.J. at 71 (acts of ethnic cleansing “may be
significant as indicative of the presence of a specific intent inspiring [genocidal] acts”); Prosecutor v.
Blagojević & Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Judgment, ¶ 123 (May 9, 2007) (holding that forcible
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example, in Krstić, the ICTY trial chamber convicted the accused of genocide, using forcible displacement to support a finding of genocidal intent. The trial chamber held that the accused had the requisite genocidal
intent because he sought to eliminate all of the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica as a community.114 By killing all military-aged men and forcibly
transferring women, children, and the elderly, the Bosnian Serb forces
effectively destroyed the community of the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica and eliminated all likelihood that the community could ever reestablish itself on that territory.115 On appeal, the accused claimed that the
trial chamber impermissibly broadened the definition of genocide by using displacement as evidence of destruction.116 However, the appeals
chamber affirmed the trial chamber’s decision because evidence of the
forcible transfer of women was used in support of the trial chamber’s
finding of intent to physically destroy.117 Given the patriarchal character
of the Bosnian Muslim population, killing the men and removing the
women “had severe procreative implications for the Srebrenica Muslim
community, potentially consigning the community to extinction.”118
Thus, the accused was found to have intended to destroy the Bosnian
Muslim population because he must have known that the displacement of
the women would contribute to the physical destruction of the Bosnian
Muslim population;119 the long-term impact on the group’s survival was
inevitable.120 The chambers made a point to use the act of forcible transfer in conjunction with mass killings to establish only the intent to physically destroy the group.
The appeals chamber also interpreted the Bosnian Serb forces’ decision to transfer, rather than kill, Muslim women and children as evidence of genocidal intent because the forcible transfer was “an additional
means by which to ensure the physical destruction of the Bosnian Muslim community in Srebrenica” meant to eliminate even the residual possibility that the Muslim community could reconstitute itself.121 At the
time that the Bosnian Serb forces decided to transfer Muslim women and
transfers and separations are relevant considerations in inferring genocidal intent but do not themselves suffice to demonstrate the intent to destroy).
114. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 594 (Aug. 2, 2001).
115. Id. ¶¶ 594–99. See also Prosecutor v. Blogojević & Jović, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 666 (Jan. 17, 2005) (the Trial Chamber found that physical or biological destruction was the
likely outcome of a forcible transfer if the group could no longer reconstitute itself—particularly
when it involves the separation of its members).
116. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 24 (Apr. 19, 2004).
117. Id. ¶ 29.
118. Id. ¶ 28.
119. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, ¶ 595.
120. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, ¶ 28.
121. Id. ¶ 31.
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children, Srebrenica had attracted international attention and U.N. troops
occupied nearby territories.122 Thus, the forcible transfer was the best
method, under the circumstances, for implementing the genocidal design
because it minimized the risk of retribution.123 Because the forcible
transfer of a community was interpreted as an additional, lesser means of
implementing the genocidal policy, it is unlikely that it alone, unaccompanied by killings, would be enough to prove genocidal intent.
Second, perpetrators who fail to employ physically destructive
means available to them do not intend to destroy. In Brđjanin, the ICTY
declined to hold the accused, a leading political figure amongst the Bosnian Serbs in the Bosnian Krajina region, criminally responsible for the
crime of genocide because he lacked genocidal intent.124 The trial chamber found that the policy of deportation and forcible transfer targeted
specifically at the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat communities was
implemented through armed force, expulsion, intimidation, the imposition of intolerable living conditions, and the establishment of punitive
departure conditions.125 Although the trial chamber acknowledged the
similarities between the acts and policies of genocide and ethnic cleansing,126 it distinguished a policy of ethnic cleansing from a genocidal policy; the ethnic cleansing policy aimed to achieve an ethnically homogenous state by permanently removing non-Serbs through the use of force
and fear, not by destroying Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat
groups.127 The trial chamber reasoned that, because the Serb forces were
capable of mustering the logistical resources (guns, ammunition, etc.) to
forcibly displace tens of thousands of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats, the accused could have employed the same resources to destroy
them if such had been his intent.128 Ultimately, the trial chamber found
that the accused lacked genocidal intent129 because using force and fear
to displace a population is not indicative of the intent to destroy when
enough weapons are available to kill off the population. In other words,
because a policy of ethnic cleansing entails less extreme means, its aim is
not destruction.
122. Id. ¶¶ 31–32.
123. Id. ¶ 32.
124. Prosecutor v. Brđjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 989 (Sept. 1, 2004).
125. Id. ¶ 1027.
126. Id. ¶ 981 (“[T]here are obvious similarities between genocidal policy and the policy
known as ethnic cleansing. The underlying criminal acts for each may often be the same.”).
127. Id.
128. Id. ¶ 978. This conclusion may conflict with the ICTY’s holding in Krstić, which held
that “the offence of genocide does not require proof that the perpetrator chose the most efficient
method to accomplish his objective of destroying the targeted part.” Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No.
IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 32 (Apr. 19, 2004).
129. Brđjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, ¶ 989.
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Third, the intent to displace is not the intent to destroy. In Bosnia
& Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro, the ICJ acknowledged that acts
of ethnic cleansing may fall within the acts listed under Article II of the
Genocide Convention.130 However, the ICJ held that a policy of ethnic
cleansing, defined as rendering an area ethnically homogenous, cannot
be characterized as genocide because the forcible deportation or displacement of the members of a group “is not necessarily equivalent to
destruction of that group, nor is such destruction an automatic consequence of the displacement.”131 Although the ICJ did not elaborate on
the precise rationale for the distinction, it relied upon the premise that
dislocation does not necessarily destroy a group.132 Similarly, the ICC
has held that the practice of ethnic cleansing may result in the commission of the crime of genocide when genocide’s objective elements are
committed with the intent to destroy.133 In its decision, however, the pretrial chamber did not elaborate on whether a policy of ethnic cleansing
was sufficient to establish genocidal intent.
Through these distinctions, the ICTY, the ICJ, and the ICC have established that a policy of ethnic cleansing, whether or not accompanied
by genocidal acts, fails to demonstrate an intention to destroy a group.
Their justification is simply that displacement of a group is not destruction of that group.
IV. ETHNIC CLEANSING IS GENOCIDE
Problems of interpretation arise when genocidal acts are committed
with the general intent to displace an ethnic group in addition to the specific intent to create an ethnically homogenous region. The current international jurisprudence on ethnic cleansing fails to thoroughly explain
why displacement is not equivalent to destruction, and therefore, why
ethnic cleansing is not equivalent to genocide. While its literal interpretation would suggest a distinction, destruction within the context of genocide actually suggests a similarity. Because genocide denies human
groups the right to exist, displacement of ethnic groups bears a strong
resemblance to genocidal destruction. This Part first suggests that the
Genocide Convention’s legislative history and its final provisions prohibit cultural destruction, despite the ICTY’s and the ICJ’s attempts to exclude it. Second, this Part describes how methods of ethnic cleansing
130. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 1, 71 (Judgment of Feb. 26).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, ¶ 145 (Mar. 4, 2009).
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seclude or dismember the targeted group, which effectively destroys that
group. Finally, this Part identifies international courts and tribunals’ use
of an inaccurate basis for comparison: the ICTY and the ICJ mistakenly
regard the intent to displace as ethnic cleansing’s specific intent. Once
ethnic homogeneity is recognized as ethnic cleansing’s ultimate goal, it
is easier to see how a policy of ethnic cleansing threatens the same values protected by the prohibition against genocide. Both the practice and
the purpose of ethnic cleansing are genocidal: forcibly transferring an
ethnic group from a region effectively destroys the ethnic group, and desiring ethnic homogeneity is equivalent to denying an ethnic group the
right to exist.
A. Genocide Is Cultural Destruction
The drafters of the Genocide Convention, the ILC, and international
courts have been fervent in their exclusion of cultural destruction from
the crime of genocide.134 Despite these efforts, cultural destruction is a
fundamental principle upon which the crime of genocide was originally
formulated as well as an aspect of its current definition.
1. Genocide as the Inexistence of Culturally Significant Human Groups
The crime of genocide does not protect every group’s right to exist.
It protects only those groups that make significant cultural contributions
that cannot be disassociated from the community in which they have
thrived.
Depriving society of a particular group’s social and cultural contributions is the principal evil that the crime of genocide aimed to punish.135
In formulating the crime of genocide, Lemkin and the U.N. General Assembly defined genocide as denying entire human groups the right of
existence.136 Underlying the denial of a group’s right to exist is the cultural loss to humanity.137 For “[i]f the diversity of cultures were de134. U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 83d mtg., supra note 99, at 206; Report of the International Law
Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 22, at 90–91; Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-9833-T, Judgment, ¶ 576 (Aug. 2, 2001); Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont., 2007 I.C.J. at 124.
135. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 83d mtg., supra note 99, at 195 (“[T]he concept of genocide should extend to the inclusion of acts less terrible in themselves but resulting ‘in great losses to
humanity in the form of cultural and other contributions,’ for which it was indebted to the destroyed
human group.”).
136. Lemkin, Genocide, supra note 25, at 229 (“[B]y the formulation of genocide as a crime,
the principle that every national, racial and religious group has a natural right of existence is
claimed.”); G.A. Res. 96(I), at 188 (Dec. 11, 1946) (“Genocide is a denial of the right of existence of
entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings.”).
137. See The Secretary-General, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, supra note 84, at
27 (Genocide aims “at the rapid and complete disappearance of the cultural, moral and religious life
of a group of human beings.”); G.A. Res. 96(I), at 188–89 (Dec. 11, 1946) (“[D]enial of the right of

2010]

Expanding the Crime of Genocide

511

stroyed, it would be as disastrous for civilization as the physical destruction of nations.”138
We can best understand this when we realize how impoverished our
culture would be if the peoples doomed by Germany, such as the
Jews, had not been permitted to create the Bible, or to give birth to
an Einstein, a Spinoza; if the Poles had not had the opportunity to
give the world a Copernicus, a Chopin, a Curie; the Czechs, a Huss,
a Dvorak; the Greeks, a Plato and a Socrates; the Russians, a Tolstoy and a Shostakovich.139

Because certain human groups provide important moral, intellectual, and
spiritual contributions, the crime of genocide was principally concerned
with protecting such groups.
Not all groups of people enjoy the same protection under the crime
of genocide; only permanent and stable groups140 identified by cultural
characteristics are protected. The Genocide Convention applies to victimized national, ethnic, racial, or religious groups141 and purposely excludes groups defined by their politics, economic and social status, language, gender, sexual orientation, physical or mental disability, and
age.142 While national, ethnic, racial, and religious groups were accepted
with little disagreement,143 the international courts still faced the challenge of identifying such groups.
In determining whether a group of people constitutes one of the
protected groups, international courts must ascertain particular characte-

existence shocks the conscience of mankind, [and] results in great losses to humanity in the form of
cultural and other contributions represented by these human groups.”).
138. The Secretary-General, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, supra note 84, at 27.
139. Lemkin, Genocide, supra note 25, at 228.
140. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 511 (Sept. 2, 1998) (holding
that genocide targets stable and permanent groups determined by birth, “with the exclusion of the
more ‘mobile’ groups which one joins through individual voluntary commitment, such as political
and economic groups.”); U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 69th mtg. at 56–61, U.N. Doc A/C.6/SR.69 (Oct. 7,
1948); The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the International Commission
of Inquiry on Darfur, ¶ 501, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (Sept. 18,
2004).
141. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. II.
142. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 150–71. During the
drafting of the Genocide Convention, the Sixth Committee left out political and economic groups
because nationality, race, and religion were deemed more stable and permanent and less contentious
among state representatives. U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 69th mtg. at 56–61, U.N. Doc A/C.6/SR.69
(Oct. 7, 1948). It was not until its 128th meeting that the Sixth Committee decided to delete political
groups from the listed groups under article II. U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 128th mtg. at 664, U.N. Doc
A/C.6/SR.128 (Nov. 29, 1948).
143. U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 69th mtg. at 56–61, U.N. Doc A/C.6/SR.69 (Oct. 7, 1948).
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ristics of the group that set it apart from the rest of society.144 The characteristics relied upon tend to be cultural.145 The crime of genocide defines groups by their culture—suggesting that the ultimate evil is cultural
destruction. Although it is beyond the scope of this Comment to discuss
sociological explanations for the special protection afforded to these
groups, one compelling argument is that the cultures of national, ethnic,
racial, and religious groups are deeply embedded in the land.146 These
groups are commonly defined by beliefs, customs, and connections to the
land in which they live.147 Consequently, removing members of these
groups from their homes not only deprives members of their basic survival needs, but it also destroys the group as a culturally significant unit.
Contrary to the accepted justifications for excluding cultural destruction,148 genocide is cultural destruction not as a coincidental consequence, but as an intended consequence. Lemkin and the General Assembly sought to criminalize this intent to destroy when they defined
genocide as the denial of a group’s right to exist and selected culturally
significant human groups for protection.
2. The Crime of Genocide Explicitly Includes Cultural Destruction
In addition to the implied inclusion of cultural destruction, the
crime of genocide also explicitly includes acts categorized as cultural
destruction. The forcible transfer of children is a genocidal act that can144. See Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 521 (July 31, 2003) (“The
group must be targeted because of characteristics peculiar to it, and the specific intent must be to
destroy the group as a separate and distinct entity.”).
145. See Prosecutor v. Blagojević & Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 666 (Jan. 17,
2005) (a group is considered separate and distinct based on “its history, traditions, the relationship
between its members, the relationship with other groups, [and] the relationship with the land.”);
Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 557 (Aug. 2, 2001) (“A group’s cultural,
religious, ethnical, or national characteristics must be identified within the socio-historic context
which it inhabits.”); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 513 (Sept. 2, 1998)
(defining an ethnic group as a group whose members share a common language or culture and defining a religious group as one whose members share the same religion, denomination or mode of worship). But see id. ¶ 514 (holding the definition of racial group is “based on the hereditary physical
traits often identified within a geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or
religious factors.”).
146. See Kristen A. Carpenter, Real Property and Peoplehood, 27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 313
(2008) (arguing that land is essential to the identity and cultural survival of collective groups); Margaret Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982) (arguing that individuality and
selfhood are intertwined with property such that property cannot be replaced without pain).
147. See Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, ¶ 137 (defining a distinct ethnic group by its
own language, its own tribal customs, and “its own traditional links to its lands.”) (emphasis added);
Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-T, ¶ 666 (holding that a group is considered separate and distinct
based on “its history, traditions, the relationship between its members, the relationship with other
groups, [and] the relationship with the land.”) (emphasis added).
148. See supra text accompanying note 100.
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not be appropriately categorized as either physical or biological destruction. The process by which the forcible transfer of children was eventually adopted may have caused confusion: the U.N. Secretary-General’s
draft included the forcible transfer of children as a form of cultural genocide;149 the Ad Hoc Committee’s draft included cultural genocide but
excluded the forcible transfer of children;150 and the Sixth Committee’s
draft excluded cultural destruction151 but included the forcible transfer of
children.152 Thus, when the General Assembly adopted the Sixth Committee’s draft, the Genocide Convention was understood to exclude cultural genocide but to retain the genocidal act of forcibly transferring
children.
In maintaining an interpretation consistent with the drafters’ ultimate decision to exclude cultural destruction, the ILC claimed that the
forcible transfer of children is an act of biological genocide.153 Without
further elaboration, the ILC depicted the forcible transfer of children as
having “particularly serious consequences for future viability of a group
as such.”154 However, it is difficult to understand how the forcible transfer of children destroys the viability of the group. If, by viability, the
ILC meant the biological survival of the group, then there is no destruction, for surely children of a group can procreate with one another in a
different territory. The destruction is cultural.155 By transferring children of a group to another territory, the children are forced to assimilate
into a new community—a community with different practices, traditions,
customs, and beliefs.156 Thus, uprooting children from their families and
149. The Secretary-General, Draft Convention on the Crime of Genocide, supra note 84, at 27.
150. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide, supra note 98, at 15, 17–19.
151. U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 83d mtg., supra note 99, at 206.
152. U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 82d mtg. at 190, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.82 (Oct. 23, 1948).
153. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 22, at
90–92.
154. Id.
155. Schabas conceded this point when he stated that the forcible transfer of children is
“somewhat anomalous, because it contemplates what is in reality a form of cultural genocide . . . the
prosecution would be required to prove the intent ‘to destroy’ the group in a cultural sense rather
than in a physical or biological sense.” SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
11, at 294. Similarly, in Krajiŝnik, the ICTY held that destruction is not limited to physical or biological destruction of the group’s members “since the group (or a part of it) can be destroyed in other
ways, such as by transferring children out of the group.” Prosecutor v. Krajiŝnik, Case No. IT-0039-T, Judgment, ¶ 854 (Sept. 27, 2006).
156. The process of forcing children at an impressionable and receptive age to a culture and
mentality different from their parents’ “tends to bring about the disappearance of the group as a
cultural unit in a relatively short time.” The Secretary-General, Draft Convention on the Crime of
Genocide, supra note 84, at 27. In arguing for the inclusion of cultural genocide, the delegate from
Venezuela reminded the other Sixth Committee members that the forcible transfer of children was
adopted because the children of a group will be transferred to a place “where they would be given an
education different from that of their own group, and would have new customs, a new religion and
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communities, in effect, precludes children from learning and identifying
with their ethnic heritage. The harm is the disappearance of an ethnicity.
While the ICTY, the ICJ, and the ILC have followed the drafters’
intent in interpreting the Genocide Convention to exclude cultural destruction,157 the inclusion of the act of forcibly transferring children within the final draft and subsequent international court and tribunal statutes158 perpetuates the ambiguous relationship between cultural destruction and genocide. Given the confusion regarding cultural destruction,
inclusion of ethnic cleansing within the crime of genocide may actually
be consistent with the aims and purposes of the crime of genocide.
B. Forcible Displacement Is a Method of Permanent Destruction
To determine whether a policy of ethnic cleansing intends to destroy, ethnic cleansing must constitute destruction. Several commentators and the ICTY distinguish between ethnic cleansing and genocide
based on genocide’s irreversible destruction.159 They argue that the ethnic group, once removed, still exists, while a group, once exterminated,
does not.160 However, history suggests otherwise: displacing a group
permanently destroys it. There are two means by which displacement
leads to destruction: seclusion and dismemberment.
Even if the members of an ethnic group survive, secluding an ethnic
group so that it can no longer participate in society effectively destroys
the group. Although, in practice, ethnic cleansing has been confined to
only one or a few territories,161 it is easy to realize the devastating consequences that a policy of ethnic cleansing has when shared by many

probably a new language.” U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 83d mtg., supra note 99. The forcible transfer of
children is “tantamount to the destruction of their group, whose future depended on that generation
of children.” Id.
157. See supra Part III.B.
158. See Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 6, ¶ (e); ICTR Statute, supra note 6, art. 2, ¶ 2(e);
ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 4, ¶ 2(e); Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. II, ¶ (e).
159. E.g., Paul Behrens, A Moment of Kindness? Consistency and Genocidal Intent, in THE
CRIMINAL LAW OF GENOCIDE, 125, 133 (Ralph Henham & Paul Behrens eds., 2007).
160. See, e.g., SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 234 (“ethnic
cleansing tolerates the existence of the group elsewhere whereas genocide may not”); Behrens, supra
note 159, at 133 (“‘Destruction’ carries a distinct notion of permanence which does not inhabit the
concept of ‘expulsion’: the group still exists, and it cannot even be said with certainty that it will
never again re-form on its accustomed territory.”).
161. For example, during the Nazi Holocaust, victimized groups were cleansed from Germany,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia; during the Yugoslav war, Serb forces cleansed Bosnia and Herzegovina of Muslims and Croats; and in Darfur, the Sudanese government and militia aim to cleanse Darfur
of certain African tribal groups. See Part V for a more detailed discussion of the geographic limitations of genocide and ethnic cleansing.
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states.162 If a particular ethnic group is purged from every territory in
which it resides or seeks refuge, what is to become of the group? A
group that is completely isolated from the rest of society can no longer
interact with or contribute to the outside world. Consequently, an ethnic
group’s physical existence becomes meaningless because its social value—its culture, language, customs, scriptures, etc.—ceases to exist.
A second method by which an ethnic group may be destroyed is
dismemberment. Displacing an ethnic group effectively dismembers the
group by severing the bonds between members. In several decisions, the
ICTY has acknowledged the cultural destruction that often accompanies
the removal of entire human groups from a given region.163 For example,
in Krajiŝnik, the trial chamber held that destruction is not limited to
physical or biological destruction because a group can be destroyed by
severing the bonds among its members.164 The chamber claimed, “[i]t is
not accurate to speak of ‘the group’ as being amenable to physical or biological destruction” because the bonds among group members as well as
the group’s culture and beliefs are neither physical nor biological.165 Similarly, in Blagojević, the trial chamber held that physical destruction
included dismemberment of the group by means of forcible transfer.166
The chamber reasoned that the group ceases to exist as a group when the
forcible transfer of group members prevents the group from reconstituting itself.167 Although these decisions were not applied or upheld,168 they
162. Although it is easier to comprehend the large-scale effects of seclusion, the small-scale
effects are the same. When only one or a few states share a policy of ethnic cleansing, secluding an
ethnic group from the rest of society has the same destructive effect: deprivation of the moral and
social value that that group has to offer.
163. See Prosecutor v. Krajiŝnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, Judgment, ¶ 854 (Sept. 27, 2006);
Prosecutor v. Blagojević & Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶ 666 (Jan. 17, 2005); Prosecutor
v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 574 (Aug. 2, 2001); Prosecutor v. Karadžić & Mladić,
Cases No. IT-95-5-R61, IT-95-18-R-61, Review of Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61, ¶ 94 (July 11,
1996).
164. Krajiŝnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, ¶ 854.
165. Id. ¶ 854 n.1701. See also Krstić, in which the trial chamber held that, in addition to
physical destruction, “one may also conceive of destroying a group through purposeful eradication
of its culture and identity resulting in the eventual extinction of the group as an entity distinct from
the remainder of the community.” Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, ¶ 574.
166. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-T, ¶ 666. See also Karadžić, in which the trial chamber
notes that acts that serve to dismember the group are designed to reach the very foundations of the
group. Karadžić, Case Nos. IT-95-5-R61, IT-95-18-R-61, ¶ 94.
167. Blagojević, Case No. IT-02-60-T, ¶ 666.
168. In Krajiŝnik, the trial chamber did not explicitly apply a definition of destruction that
incorporated cultural destruction. Krajiŝnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, ¶ 854. Rather, the chamber held
that the accused’s principal objective to forcibly remove Muslims and Croats from certain territories
did not constitute genocidal intent. Id. ¶ 1092. In Blagojević, the appeals chamber, while acknowledging that forcible transfers were relevant considerations in assessing whether the perpetrators had
genocidal intent, overturned the trial chamber’s finding of complicity to commit genocide because
the forcible transfer operation alone, or coupled with the murders and mistreatment in Bratunac
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serve to demonstrate the permanent cultural loss that results from dividing and disconnecting an ethnic group.
The cultural loss experienced after severing the bonds between individual members of an ethnic group is often permanent. During the
Yugoslav war, Serb forces committed murder and other inhumane acts
against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats to instill fear and to force
the population to leave.169 To ensure that members of these groups
would not return, Serb forces demolished and appropriated Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat property, homes, and places of worship.170 These
and similar methods of ethnic cleansing proved successful in their goal,
as the demography of Bosnia and Herzegovina rapidly changed.171 In
1993, 810,000 Croats and Muslims were displaced internally and
700,000 refugees were located in other countries.172 Those who survived
the attacks could not return or successfully re-establish their lives: the
homes demolished by the attacks were no longer standing; survivors
could not contemplate going back due to the pain and fear associated
with the attacks; Bosnian Muslim women, accustomed to the patriarchal
society in which they lived, suddenly became the heads of households
but could not find employment; and dismembered family units caused
irreparable damage to children’s development.173
Similarly, in Darfur, government forces and militias have carried
out large-scale forcible displacement,174 destruction of villages, pillaging,
killings, torture, rape, and other inhumane treatment against ethnically
African groups (specifically, the Fur, the Masalit, and the Zaghawa tribes, which are distinguishable from Arab tribes in the region).175 Reports
indicate that the attacks committed against these African tribes constitute
ethnic cleansing.176 The deliberate destruction of villages and forcible
displacement of African tribes from the region has essentially led to the
town, did not suffice to demonstrate intent to destroy the protected group. Prosecutor v. Blagojević
& Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-A, ¶ 123 (May 9, 2007).
169. Krajiŝnik, Case No. IT-00-39-T, ¶ 1093.
170. Id. ¶ 1095.
171. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human
Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, ¶ 20, submitted
to the Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/50 (Feb. 10, 1993) [hereinafter Mazowiecki Report of 1993].
172. Id.
173. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 90–94 (Aug. 2, 2001). See also
Prosecutor v. Blagojević & Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 162–64 (Jan. 17, 2005).
174. As of 2007, the conflict in Darfur had generated 1.25 million internally displaced persons
and over 200,000 refugees. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Trends in Displacement, Protection and Solutions, 2007 UNHCR STAT. Y.B. 66.
175. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 140, ¶¶ 186,
192–93.
176. Id. ¶ 194. E.g., Darfur Destroyed, supra note 3, at 39–40.
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permanent expulsion of these groups from their places of habitation.177
Historical accounts suggest that the effects of the attacks are permanent:
internally displaced persons remain afraid to return to their places of origin out of fear of renewed attacks,178 and Arab populations have settled
in areas previously occupied by the displaced populations.179 Without
the possibility of returning and reconstituting themselves, the displaced
African tribes from Darfur can no longer carry on their existence as sedentary farmers on tribal land.180
Forcible removals like those in the former Yugoslavia and Darfur
demonstrate the permanent effect that ethnic cleansing has within a region. The irreversible ethnic recomposition of a territory manifests itself
as a form of destruction because members of an ethnic group are
uprooted from their homes without the possibility of reestablishing the
communal ties, traditions, or practices that once defined them.
C. A Policy of Ethnic Cleansing Intends to Destroy
Even though international courts and tribunals have determined that
acts of ethnic cleansing constitute destruction, they have excluded ethnic
cleansing from the crime of genocide because of its distinguishable specific intent—the intent to displace. What the courts and tribunals have
failed to realize is that ethnic cleansing’s specific intent is not the intent
to displace, but rather the intent to achieve ethnic homogeneity. This
misconception has led to the exclusion of ethnic cleansing from the
crime of genocide. By categorizing ethnic cleansing as persecution and
not as genocide,181 international courts and tribunals devalue the permanent destruction that ethnic cleansing causes. Ethnic cleansing is more
than just discriminatory. Therefore, because ethnic cleansing is capable
of destruction and the ethnic cleanser’s mental state is one of extreme
intolerance, a policy of ethnic cleansing intends to destroy.
177. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 140, ¶ 195 (concluding from observations and eyewitness accounts that militias are occupying the villages previously occupied by displaced groups, continuing to raid and attack the villages, and destroying essential
food stocks and water sources to ensure that no one will return).
178. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 140, ¶ 197;
Darfur Destroyed, supra note 3, at 35.
179. Id.
180. Prior to the attacks, the African tribes consisted of settled farmers who had thrived on the
same land for years. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, supra note 140, ¶
194 n.107.
181. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, ¶ 142 (Mar. 4, 2009); Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 1,
70 (Judgment of Feb. 26); Prosecutor v. Kupre{ki}, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 636 (Jan. 14,
2000).

518

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 33:2

1. Ethnic Cleansing’s Specific Intent
To accurately compare genocide to ethnic cleansing, the elements
of each crime must be clearly articulated. Because genocide’s distinguishing feature is its specific intent, the intent to destroy must be compared to a policy of ethnic cleansing. Without a formal statute, the mens
rea requirement of ethnic cleansing is unclear. Genocide scholars and
the ICTY have attempted to define ethnic cleansing’s specific intent as
the intent to displace. However, in doing so, they have confused ethnic
cleansing’s specific intent with its general intent, thus making erroneous
distinctions determinative. A proper comparison addresses ethnic cleansing’s intent to create ethnically homogenous regions, not merely its intent to displace.
In his comprehensive book, Genocide in International Law, William A. Schabas discounts the claim that ethnic cleansing is a form of
genocide because of the crimes’ conflicting intents.182 He argues that
although ethnic cleansing and genocide may share the goal of eliminating
the persecuted group from a given area, the crimes have different specific
intents: “One is intended to displace a population, the other to destroy it.
The issue is one of intent and it is logically inconceivable that the two
agendas coexist.”183 While one may argue that the intent to displace is
separate from the intent to destroy, the problem with Schabas’s claim is
that ethnic cleansing’s specific intent is to create an ethnically homogenous territory, not to displace a population.
Unfortunately, the ICTY applies Schabas’s argument in drawing a
distinction between ethnic cleansing’s specific intent—the intent to displace—and genocide’s intent to destroy.184 By attaching the wrong specific intent to ethnic cleansing, the ICTY’s analysis is inherently flawed.
For example, in Krstić, the ICTY Appeals Chamber found that the accused lacked genocidal intent because his specific intent to carry out
forcible displacement could be distinguished from the specific intent of
other members of the Serb military who saw the forcible displacement as
a means of advancing a genocidal plan.185 Both the accused and the oth182. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 234.
183. Id.
184. See Prosecutor v. Brđjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 982 n.2472 (Sept. 1, 2004)
(citing Schabas’s Genocide in International Law to support the Chamber’s holding that a genocidal
campaign is distinct from a campaign of massive displacement); Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 33 n.53 (Apr. 19, 2004); (citing Schabas’s Genocide in International Law to
support the Chamber’s reliance on forcible transfer only to infer, not to exclusively establish genocidal intent); Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgment, ¶ 519 n.1097 (July 31, 2003)
(citing Schabas’s Genocide in International Law to support the Chamber’s holding that expulsion of
a group does not in itself suffice to establish genocide).
185. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, ¶ 133.
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er members of the Serb military intended to displace the population. The
accused, however, did not intend to displace as a means of destroying the
Bosnian Muslim population. Thus, the intent to displace an ethnic group
is both consistent with genocidal intent (in the case of the other members
of the Serb military) and inconsistent with genocidal intent (in the case of
the accused). When the general intent to displace is accompanied by the
specific intent to destroy, the intent to destroy and the intent to displace
coexist, contrary to Schabas’s claim. Because the displacement of a
group can further both a genocidal policy and a policy of ethnic cleansing, the intent to displace is not the proper basis for distinction.
The proper basis for comparison is the overall objective of each
crime, which, for ethnic cleansing, is the intent to create ethnically homogenous regions, not the intent to displace. The displacement of a
group can be achieved either directly or indirectly. Where the displacement of a group is achieved directly by physically removing the group—
for example, taking people from their homes and involuntarily deporting
them outside the state or region—the actus reus is the physical removal
of the group.186 Because the general intent of a crime requires nothing
more than the intent to commit a particular act,187 the intent to displace is
ethnic cleansing’s general intent. Just as the acts enumerated in provisions (a), (b), and (e) of the crime of genocide require, respectively, the
intent to kill, the intent to cause serious bodily or mental harm, and the
intent to forcibly transfer children,188 the act of displacing a group requires the intent to displace.189 In contrast, a policy of ethnic cleansing
entails displacing a group for the purpose of rendering an area ethnically
homogenous.190 Creating an ethnically pure area is the end,191 while dis186. “The action taken against the individual members of the group is the means used to
achieve the ultimate criminal objective with respect to the group.” Report of the International Law
Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 22, at 88.
187. A general-intent crime is one “that involves performing a particular act without intending
a further act or a further result.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 428 (9th ed. 2009). Cf. Report of the
International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 22, at 88 (holding that the crime
of genocide, in addition to a general intent to commit the act, requires “a specific intent with respect
to the overall consequences of the prohibited act”).
188. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 22,
at 88 (stating that the crime of genocide requires a general intent to commit one of the prohibited
acts enumerated in sub-paragraphs of Article II of the Genocide Convention).
189. See infra Part V.A for a discussion of how the general intent to displace may be incorporated into the crime of genocide.
190. Secretary-General Letter, supra note 4, ¶ 55 (“‘[E]thnic cleansing’ means rendering an
area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from
the area.”).
191. During the Yugoslav war, ethnic cleansing was used as a military term, meaning “to clean
the territory” of ethnic contamination in the final phases of combat. Pretrovic, supra note 5, at 343.
In English and in French, reference is made to ethnic purification. Id.
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placing is the means. Thus, the specific intent is not to displace but to
ethnically cleanse.
Where the displacement of a group is achieved indirectly—through
coercive means such as threats of violence, destruction of homes, or contaminating a community’s only source of food or water—the intent to
displace does not adequately describe the perpetrator’s specific intent.
Displacing a group is the physical result, but it does not explain why the
perpetrator desires to displace a certain group; it does not fully capture
the underlying motive.192 When acts are committed in furtherance of a
policy of ethnic cleansing, intending to create an ethnically homogenous
region is the specific intent. The principal evil is the establishment of
ethnically homogenous regions, not merely as an accidental or unintended consequence, but as the ultimate goal.193
Therefore, in determining whether a policy of ethnic cleansing constitutes genocidal intent, the real issue is whether the intent to create an
ethnically homogenous territory is equivalent to the intent to destroy.
2. Ethnic Cleansing Is More Than Just Discriminatory
Ethnic cleansing, like genocide, is more than just discriminatory—it
is destructive. International courts and tribunals continue to prosecute
ethnic cleansing as the crime of persecution because persecution requires
a discriminatory intent. Persecution is broadly defined194 as the “intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity.”195 Persecutory acts are directed against individuals of a protected group because they belong to that group.196 While ethnic cleansing clearly falls
within the crime of persecution because of its discriminatory nature,197
192. The specific intent of a crime like genocide “is characterized by the psychological relationship between the physical result and the mental state of the perpetrator.” Prosecutor v. Akayesu,
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 518 (Sept. 2, 1998). See also 22 C.J.S. Crim Law § 40 (2008)
(“The term ‘specific intent’ is used to designate a specific mental element which is required above
and beyond any mental state required with respect to the actus reus of the crime.”).
193. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human
Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, ¶ 6, submitted to
the Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/S-1/10 (Oct. 27, 1992) (“[T]he principal
objective of the military conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the establishment of ethnicallyhomogeneous regions. Ethnic cleansing does not appear to be the consequence of the war but rather
its goal.”).
194. Prosecutor v. Kupre{ki}, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 623 (Jan. 14, 2000).
195. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 7, ¶ 2(g). See also Kupre{ki}, Case No. IT-95-16-T, ¶
621.
196. Kupre{ki}, Case No. IT-95-16-T, ¶ 636.
197. By virtue of targeting undesirable ethnic groups, ethnic cleansing is discriminatory. Even
though the label “ethnic cleansing” would suggest that groups are targeted based on negative characteristics (e.g., non-German, non-Serb, or non-Arab), policies of ethnic cleansing typically identify
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this does not justify its exclusion from the crime of genocide because
genocide, like ethnic cleansing, is a form of persecution.198 Even though
both persecution and genocide require the intent to discriminate, genocide’s distinct intent to destroy elevates the level of culpability.199 Thus,
if a policy of ethnic cleansing is more than just discriminatory, and also
intends to destroy, then ethnic cleansing is more appropriately categorized as a form of genocide.
3. A Policy of Ethnic Cleansing Intends to Destroy
Destruction of an ethnic group is not just the probable consequence
of implementing a policy of ethnic cleansing; it is also the desired consequence. The impermanence of forcibly removing a group is an obstacle
for meeting not only the crime of genocide’s actus reus requirements, but
also its mens rea requirements. Many would agree that Hitler’s intention
to destroy all of the Jews in Europe constituted genocidal intent. However, Schabas argues that this was a “modest ambition,” one amounting
to only ethnic cleansing.200 What made Hitler’s policy genocidal, according to Schabas, was his intention to extend his murderous campaign
to the rest of the world.201 This argument is inconsistent with the crime
of genocide’s elements and underlying principles. In fact, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has explicitly refuted such an argument.202
A genocidal policy is not required to stretch the entire globe.203
Recall that genocidal intent is the intent to destroy a group “in whole or
in part.”204 Thus, the intent to destroy may be geographically limited to a

victims according to positive characteristics (e.g., Jews, Bosnian Muslims, or African tribes). See,
e.g., Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. &
Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 1, 73–74 (Judgment of Feb. 26) (holding that while a protected
group must be identified according to particular positive characteristics, Bosnian Muslims were
referenced according to their particular group identity).
198. Kupre{ki}, Case No. IT-95-16-T, ¶ 636 (“[F]rom the viewpoint of mens rea, genocide is
an extreme and most inhuman form of persecution.”).
199. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, ¶ 142 (Mar. 4, 2009); Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont., 2007 I.C.J.
at 70; Kupre{ki}, Case No. IT-95-16-T, ¶ 636.
200. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 234.
201. Id.
202. Even though the Nazis intended to eliminate only the Jews within Europe, and the Hutus
did not intend to eliminate the Tutsis beyond Rwanda’s borders, the ICTY Appeals Chamber recognized that both genocidal campaigns targeted a substantial part of the ethnic groups. Prosecutor v.
Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 13 (Apr. 19, 2004).
203. E.g., Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, ¶ 146; Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.,
2007 I.C.J. at 74; Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 586 (Aug. 2, 2001); Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 22, at 89.
204. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. II.

522

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 33:2

region of a country or even a municipality.205 Still, the part of the group
must be substantial so as to affect the entirety.206 In determining whether
the part of the group is substantial, international courts and tribunals look
to quantitative factors, such as the numeric size of the targeted group and
the number of individuals in relation to the overall size of the group, and
qualitative factors, such as the prominence of the targeted portion within
the group (for example, if a specific part of a group is emblematic of the
overall group or essential to its survival).207 Therefore, the geographic
scope of a genocidal policy is not the deciding factor. Rather, the intention to significantly impact the group’s continued existence is the key
determination.208 In other words, a policy of ethnic cleansing does not
need to have a permanent effect; it needs to intend to have a permanent
effect.
Even if, as Schabas proclaims, it is true that genocide is the last
resort of the frustrated ethnic cleanser,209 the goals of each crime are the
same. Frustrated that he is not getting the desired effect, the ethnic
cleanser may expand or speed up his efforts, but this does not change his
original intent. Generating a more effective or successful policy—one
that targets a greater number of people or that causes immediate harm—
does not transform the desire to eradicate an ethnic group. The possibility of an ethnic group reestablishing itself elsewhere is near impossible
once group members are removed or forced to flee. Consequently, the
ethnic cleanser is well aware of the subsequent whole or partial destruction of the displaced ethnic group. It is this awareness of the permanent
effect that warrants expansion of the crime of genocide to include ethnic
cleansing.
A policy of ethnic cleansing aims to permanently rid a region of an
ethnic group to achieve ethnic homogeneity.210 The sole purpose of the
ethnic cleanser is to achieve ethnic purity. There is no other, legitimate
205. See Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, ¶ 8. See also Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, ¶
146; Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont., 2007 I.C.J. at 74; Prosecutor v. Brđjanin, Case No. IT-99-36T, Judgment, ¶ 703 (Sept. 1, 2004).
206. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, ¶¶ 9–10. See also Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3,
¶ 146; Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont., 2007 I.C.J. at 74; Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 22, at 89.
207. Krstić, Case No. IT 98-33-A, ¶ 12. See also Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, ¶
146; Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont., 2007 I.C.J. at 74.
208. Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont., 2007 I.C.J. at 74.
209. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 11, at 234.
210. See, e.g., Brđjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, ¶¶ 3, 10–11 (alleging that to create an ethnically
pure Serbian state, Serb forces needed to permanently remove, or ethnically cleanse, almost all Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from the area); Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 562–63 (Aug. 2, 2001) (claiming that Serb forces terrorized civilian populations with the
objective of ethnically cleansing the area, or forcing their flight to ensure the region would remain
Serbian forever).
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or illegitimate, reason or justification,211 and the desired effect is permanent. Intending to create an ethnically pure territory conveys to members
of the supposedly impure group, residents of the cleansed territory, and
the international community that a particular ethnic group is unworthy of
existence, and that this ethnic group is socially undesirable for reasons
stemming from utter hatred and disgust. This extreme intolerance denies
the group the right to exist, which is precisely the evil that the crime of
genocide was designed to prohibit.212
In sum, a policy of ethnic cleansing aims to eliminate an entire
people from a region213 because society—defined regionally or globally—is thought better off without it. In this way, ethnic purity poses the
greatest threat to the peace and security of mankind,214 and therefore,
demands the same level of mental culpability as genocide.
V. INTERPRETING THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE TO INCLUDE ETHNIC
CLEANSING
This Part is intended to provide a rough sketch of how to interpret
ethnic cleansing as genocide. This Part discusses first how ethnic cleansing establishes the actus reus of the crime of genocide and second how
a policy of ethnic cleansing can be interpreted as genocidal intent.

211. Legitimate reasons for removing an ethnic minority may include: to preclude insurgence,
to ensure the safety of innocent civilians during a time of war, or to protect fundamental rights and
freedoms. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 83d mtg., supra note 99, at 197–203 (in discussing
whether to include cultural genocide within the Genocide Convention, several delegates argued that
precluding a state government from interfering with a protected group’s customs or structures could
threaten the political and social advancement of its members and may overlook constructive efforts
to establish a common culture); U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 82d mtg., supra note 152, at 188 (The Polish
delegate expressed concern with adopting a provision prohibiting the transfer of children because it
“could also be applied to the evacuation of children from a theatre of war. Such evacuation had in
fact been carried out by agencies working under the auspices of the United Nations.”). Likewise,
illegitimate but distinct reasons would not constitute the intent to ethnically cleanse. For example,
the U.S.’s internment of Japanese citizens was not implemented under a policy of ethnic cleansing
because it stemmed from a belief, although unsupported, that Japanese-Americans were assisting
enemy forces.
212. G.A. Res. 96(I), at 188–89, (Dec. 11, 1946) (“Genocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups.”); Lemkin, Genocide, supra note 25, at 229 (“[B]y the formulation of
genocide as a crime, the principle that every national, racial and religious group has a natural right of
existence is claimed.”).
213. See supra note 76; Third Mazowiecki Report of 1992, supra note 75, ¶ 9 (“The term ethnic
cleansing refers to the elimination by the ethnic group exercising control over a given territory of
members of other ethnic groups.”).
214. See generally Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,
supra note 22; UN Charter pmbl., arts. 1–2.
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A. Establishing the Actus Reus of the Crime of Genocide
For the purposes of this Comment, ethnic cleansing can be categorized as forcible actual or constructive displacement of a group. Actual
displacement of a group occurs when people are physically taken from
their homes and involuntarily deported outside the state or region.215
Constructive displacement occurs when an ethnic group is displaced
from a given area by destroying group members’ homes, threatening
them with violence, or contaminating their only source of food or water.
One can easily construe acts involving either the actual or the constructive removal of a population as one of the genocidal acts specified in
the Rome Statute. The most obvious is the forcible displacement of
children. Additionally, constructive efforts to remove an ethnic group
can also be construed as killing members of the group,216 a condition of
life calculated to bring about a group’s physical destruction,217 or a
measure intended to prevent births within the group.218 Note that acts
without a violent or coercive component—such as burning books, destroying monuments, and prohibiting cultural education or the use of a
language—do not suffice. The perpetrator must use “terror-inspiring
violence to inhibit any potential return by those expelled.”219 Terrorinspiring acts include murder, rape, torture, imprisonment, theft, and destruction of public and private property.220

215. In the case of actual displacement, the actus reus is the physical removal of the group.
“The action taken against the individual members of the group is the means used to achieve the
ultimate criminal objective with respect to the group.” Report of the International Law Commission
to the General Assembly, supra note 22, at 88.
216. For example, one constructive effort might include killing some members of a group to
send a message to other members of an ethnic group that they will be subject to the same fate if they
do not leave.
217. For example, another constructive effort might include contaminating a community’s food
or water supply or destroying people’s homes and belongings so that group members are forced to
flee with no means of survival.
218. For example, a constructive effort could also include raping women who belong to a
culture in which premarital sex or extramarital sex leads to banishment from the community. The
resulting banishment would effectively preclude women from both belonging to the group and reproducing with members of their own ethnicity. Another example may include “procreative rape,”
which entails forcibly impregnating women of a protected group so that they give birth to children
who do not belong to the protected group. See Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 1, 129–30 (Judgment of Feb. 26).
219. M. CHERIF BASSIOURI & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 609 (1996).
220. Id.
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B. Interpreting a Policy of Ethnic Cleansing as Genocidal Intent
To fully capture the mindset of the ethnic cleanser, international
courts and tribunals ought to apply the limitations they already employ in
establishing genocidal intent. Because the perpetrator need only intend
to destroy a part of the group,221 international courts and tribunals can
expect to find the intent to destroy when the targeted ethnic group constitutes a substantial part of the group within a geographically limited
area.222 Where a policy of ethnic cleansing aims to forcibly remove an
ethnic group from a substantial geographic region and the portion of the
group constitutes either a large or a significant portion of the entire ethnic group, the intent to destroy is established.
Instead of interpreting the intent to achieve ethnic homogeneity as
distinct from the intent to destroy,223 international courts and tribunals
ought to interpret a policy of ethnic cleansing as a genocidal policy
where evidence sufficiently meets the stringent requirements for genocidal intent—the specific intent to destroy a protected group “as such.”224
The already-imposed limitations on genocidal intent will preclude overexpansion of the crime of genocide while appropriately criminalizing
ethnic cleansing as genocide.
VI. CONCLUSION
In light of the recent formation of the ICC, it is crucial that international tribunals, courts, and institutions adopt a consistent and conscientious interpretation of genocide. Genocide is the worst crime known to
man not only because it causes immense and widespread suffering, but
because it eliminates a human group. Losing a human group deprives
society of the group’s cultural contributions.225 While international
courts and tribunals acknowledge that the victim of genocide is the
group, they refuse to interpret the crime of genocide in a manner that
reflects its culturally destructive harm. Only by acknowledging the cultural value of protected groups, can international courts and tribunals
fully realize genocide’s harm to humanity.
Once international courts and tribunals recognize that genocide and
ethnic cleansing cause equally permanent and destructive effects, they
221. Genocide Convention, supra note 6, art. II.
222. See Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 9–10 (Apr. 19, 2004). See
also Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application
for a Warrant of Arrest, ¶ 146 (Mar. 4, 2009); Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont., 2007 I.C.J. at 74;
Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 22, at 89.
223. See supra Part III.D.
224. See Prosecutor v. Brđjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 681–703 (Sept. 1, 2004);
Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 551, 569, 581 (Aug. 2, 2001).
225. See text accompanying note 139.
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can properly interpret the crime of genocide and apply its provisions.
Ethnic cleansers who knowingly deprive an ethnic group of the opportunity to return or reconstitute itself permanently dismember that group.226
This permanent removal fulfills the meaning of destruction originally
contemplated by Lemkin and the drafters of the Genocide Convention,227
for driving an ethnic group out of a region so that its members will never
truly return denies the group’s existence. In this way, ethnic cleansing
satisfies both the actus reus and the mens rea elements of genocide.
Ethnic cleansers employ the same violent and forcible means as genocide—such as causing slow death or serious bodily or mental harm, depriving persons of all means of livelihood, and forcibly transferring
children. Moreover, their desire for ethnic homogeneity stems from the
same degree of intolerance as those who commit genocide. Thus, those
who carry out genocidal acts under a policy of ethnic cleansing should be
convicted of genocide by international courts and tribunals. Otherwise,
ethnic cleansers may continue using terror-inspiring violence to achieve
ethnic purity until the “impure” have nowhere on this earth to go.

226. See, e.g., Brđjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, ¶ 977 (holding that “the Bosnian Serb authorities in the ARK implemented a policy to create an ethnically homogeneous ARK [territory], which
entailed the forcible, unlawful and permanent removal of the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats
from the ARK”); Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-A, ¶ 31 (“The transfer completed the removal of all
Bosnian Muslims from Srebrenica, thereby eliminating even the residual possibility that the Muslim
community in the area could reconstitute itself.”).
227. See G.A. Res. 96(I), at 188–89, (Dec. 11, 1946) (“Genocide is a denial of the right of
existence of entire human groups.”); Lemkin, Genocide, supra note 25, at 229 (“[B]y the formulation of genocide as a crime, the principle that every national, racial and religious group has a natural
right of existence is claimed.”); supra Part IV.A.

